When I left Stanford in 1968 and went to IBM for a year, two things happened. I went to my first information theory symposium, which was the area I did my PhD thesis in. The speaker that year was David Kahn, a great historian of cryptography. He had just finished his best-selling book The Code Breakers, and that certainly put the idea in my head. When I was working at IBM that year, I was in the same department as Horst Feistel, who is widely regarded as the father of IBM's cryptographic research efforts that led to the Data Encryption Standard (DES) and formed a foundation on which Diffie, Merkle, and I (and others) built. Although I didn't work on cryptography at that point, I was exposed to it.
IBM was spending good money on cryptography, which reinforced my belief that there was a commercial market for encryption, when it didn't seem that way to almost anyone else. Then I worked at MIT in 1969 for two years as an assistant professor. Peter Elias, who was one of the original contributors to information theory and worked with Claude Shannon, showed me Shannon's little-known (at that time) 1949 paper relating information theory and cryptography. I thought, I'm an information theorist, maybe I can do cryptography.
When you started working on it, there were countervailing winds, one might say.
Actually, at first, IBM was given a pretty free hand by the NSA [US National Security Agency]. Feistel had worked on government crypto and had clearances. IBM also had huge contracts with the NSA and thus cleared everything with the agency. At first, there was openness, but I think it was 1974 when Diffie and I both independently showed up at Yorktown Heights [IBM Yorktown] several months apart. A secrecy order had descended on them; this was the beginning of the ill winds.
When did you connect with Diffie and Merkle?
In the spring or summer of 1974, I was at Yorktown talking with Alan Konheim, who headed the math department (where cryptography was). I had visited several times before, but this time, they were a little more mum. Management was trying to get them to work on OS security; they felt that cryptography had been solved and there was nothing more to do. Konheim said, "We can't tell INTERVIEW you much; we're being encouraged to work on other things. " Diffie showed up a few months later, and Konheim told him roughly the same thing but with one addition. He said, "Marty Hellman was here a little while ago, saying some of the same things. When you get back to Stanford, you ought to look him up. " In the fall of 1974, Diffie called me. I set up what was supposed to be a short meeting that went until 11:00 at night. It was fantastic. I'd been working in isolation, and I'm kind of a rebel in doing things against the grain. But it was nice to finally find someone else who saw things somewhat the way I did.
Merkle was a student at the University of California, Berkeley. He proposed the key distribution part, not the digital signature part of public-key cryptography. He actually did it a little before Diffie and me, but independently. We didn't know about his work. We looked at it and quickly realized that the 56-bit key size was, at best, marginal and potentially disastrous. We knew that with Moore's law and the passage of time, it would become totally inadequate. We wrote letters to NBS pointing out the problems, and they didn't really respond. We were naive enough to think they actually wanted comments on it. We didn't realize then that once something is in the Federal Register as a proposed standard, it's effectively the standard.
After six months, I realized we had a political fight on our hands, not a technical fight. It was becoming clearer, and now it's extremely clear, that the reduced key size was the NSA's doing. And that's been admitted. We got Kahn to write an op-ed in The New York Times on this, and Gina Kolata covered it for Science magazine. After that, it really started to hit the fan. So the first element of the first Crypto War was DES key size and NBS (really the NSA speaking through NBS) saying the key size was adequate for the purposes for which the standard was intended. We disagreed, because you might protect hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of data with it. We're seeing things like that today. [Five trillion dollars per day in foreign exchange transactions is protected by encryption.]
The second element of the first Crypto War was driven by our invention of public-key cryptography, when you could change your keys every minute if you wanted to. Key distribution before that involved things like sending registered letters through couriers-a very expensive process-whereas public-key cryptography allows you to do it over an insecure channel like the Internet. It sounds impossible, but it does work. So you can change keys much more frequently. While we saw DES's 56-bit key size as too small, the people in communications and signals intelligence in the NSA who were listening in on foreign powers and terrorists saw 56 bits as way too much. Mostly everything prior to that was unencrypted, so they could search, even in those days, millions or billions of words per dollar looking for key words. Once you have even a small barrier, even if it costs a dollar to get a key, that's a huge increase in cost for them. So the first Crypto War was about two things: DES key size and the freedom for us to publish our papers, both on key size and publickey cryptography.
And they threatened to jail you over that work?
Never explicitly, but there were some threats. Especially in those days, the NSA always talked in code. It was a joke back then that NSA stood for "No Such Agency" and "Never Say Anything. " IEEE got a threatening letter from an NSA employee, J.A. home address with no indication he worked for the agency, but Diffie was able to verify that he did. This person sent a letter as a concerned IEEE member, saying something like, "It bothers me that IEEE is breaking the law by publishing papers in certain areas. " He never said exactly what papers were involved and never mentioned me by name, but he listed six journal issues, and I had a paper in all but one. That's code in itself.
It's illegal to export an implement of war like an F-16 without a license, obviously. It's also illegal to export the plans without an export license, and anything cryptographic was regarded as an implement of war. So, by publishing our papers, his position was that we were violating the International Traffic and Arms Regulations [ITAR] . I've forgotten whether it was five or 10 years in jail that he cited as the punishment.
When IEEE responded to him, they copied me because I was on the board of governors of the information theory group, which had published several of the papers. But IEEE didn't send it to all the governors. So that's what I mean, that people tend to talk in code.
And you got past that by just doing it, right?
We lost the key size fight. DES stayed at 56 bits. We proposed triple DES, and that was used by a lot of people. But a lot of other people didn't use it. So we really lost on the key size until AES, the current Advanced Encryption Standard, came out about 15 years ago. We won in the long run because not only did the key size go up in AES, but it was adopted in the way we said DES should have been adopted: a transparent, open process with critiques. I think that's a step backward from our point of view, but forward from the NSA's point of view. The thing we did win on was the freedom to publish.
You did that by presenting a paper at Cornell University, instead of your students who had done some of the work, because you were in a better position to take the heat.
When I got the letter from Meyer, IEEE responded that they were well aware of the ITAR but regarded it as the author's and the author's institution's responsibility to make sure they weren't in violation. So, Stanford was potentially liable, and if I was prosecuted, I wanted to make sure I had Stanford's financial backing. Stanford's general counsel told me, "It's my legal opinion that if the ITAR are construed broadly enough to cover a publication of your paper, they're unconstitutional. But, I have to warn you, the only way to settle this is in a court case. If you're prosecuted, we will defend you.
If you're convicted, we'll appeal. But if all appeals are exhausted, we can't go to jail for you." Clipper Chip and key escrow, of which Clipper Chip was an instance, happened in the mid-1990s. The idea was that every telephone and computer that had encryption would have had a master key built into it that allowed anyone possessing it to get any session key-that is, any key used for a conversation. The master keys would be stored securely by an escrow authority. But if there was a court order, the master key would be given to the FBI, local law enforcement, or the NSA so they could listen in. This was the second Crypto War.
I served on a National Research Council committee in the mid1990s, and one of the big issues was key escrow and Clipper Chip.
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We just couldn't see how to make it work. In our final report, called CRI-SIS: Crypto graphy's Role in Securing the Information Society, which is available on the National Research Council's website, we recommended that the government experiment with key escrow for its own purposes, and if they could figure out how to solve the problems we couldn't solve (we didn't necessarily say all of this, but it was implied), then they could come back to us. But they never did. One of the problems is who holds the keys internationally. It creates a huge target. I'm an electrical engineer, rather than a computer scientist, although there's obviously a lot of overlap. So when I got the call and the ACM told me I'd won its Turing Award, I was very pleased and knew it was the ACM's top award. What I didn't realize was that there was a million dollars connected with it. My wife and I were half-joking about what we were going to do with another plaque because there's no wall space. The next day, I was talking to one of the public relations people at Stanford, and he was making a bigger deal of it than I expected. He said to me, "This might sound crass, but you're going to be asked this. What are you gonna do with all the money?" And I said, "What money?" Then I found out Google had made this a milliondollar prize. I talked with my wife, Dorothie, about it, and we quickly decided that this came at a great time, both the publicity and the money, to help publicize the book we're working on that we half-jokingly say is about reducing the divorce rate, ending needless wars, and eliminating the nuclear threat.
What got you started working on the threat posed by nuclear weapons, or reducing nuclear risk to acceptable levels? Dorothie and I were married in 1967. In 1980, 13 years into our marriage, we had two kids and a house that we couldn't afford. We didn't know it at that time because we didn't take time to look at it, but our marriage was in trouble. Dorothie had enough intuitive sense to be looking for catalysts. She was working at Touche-Ross (now Deloitte) as an auditor, and one of the partners was involved in this crazy organization that was concerned with environmental degradation. He invited us to a weekend seminar on the bigger issues of life. Dorothie jumped at the opportunity and dragged me along. The group worked at two levels: the macro level then was the environment; the micro level was, if you are married, making peace in your marriage if you don't have it already-and I know very few people who do. When Ronald Reagan became the US president, we realized the greatest environmental threat of all was nuclear war. People would call it a peace group, but it was something different. I'd say it was a human potential group, because the real problem is that our technological progress has outpaced our maturation as a species.
The problem isn't nuclear weapons or genetic engineering or-if we look 20 years out-artificial intelligence. The real problem is the chasm between the godlike physical power technology has given us and our irresponsible, adolescent behavior as a species. The bad news is that if we don't grow up, we're going to destroy ourselves. The good news is that we can stop making mistakes that are causing a lot of needless pain; if we do what's needed to survive, we'll stop getting into needless wars. We'll deal with the environment. We'll start taking a long-term perspective.
Tell us about your TNT vest analogy.
Almost nobody is concerned about nuclear weapons these days. People think of it as a problem of the past, but there are still approximately 15,000 nuclear weapons in the world. We have 7,000 in the US alone. But people act as if there's no risk. To see why that's not smart, imagine that a guy wearing a TNT vest walked into the room where you are now. He says, "Nothing to worry about. I don't have the button for setting this off. Certainly over the past 20 years it's become much greater. But the risk of nuclear war is actually the greater risk, contrary to what President Obama and many others have said. There's a very simple argument. A nuclear war would kill at least a billion people: 10 to the ninth. A nuclear terrorist incident would kill at most 10 to the fifth or 100,000. That ratio is 10,000 to 1. So nuclear war could only be the lesser risk if it is 10,000 times less likely than nuclear terrorism. And that seems improbable. We should be looking at both threats and the interconnections they have. For example, a nuclear terrorist event would create a crisis with an elevated risk of nuclear war.
Even if we could expect nuclear deterrence-threatening to destroy civilization in an effort to preserve the peace-and could expect that to work for 500 years before it failed and we destroyed ourselves, that's equivalent to playing Russian roulette with a newborn child. In Russian roulette, the risk is one in six, and one-sixth of 500 years is 83 years, about the child's expected lifetime. So why are we not looking at this? In fact, this morning I called a senator's aide to try to get Congress to authorize a National Research Council study, but nobody was very interested. While there are some people in Congress interested, it's impossible to get anything through. Why are we writing it? One reason is that almost no one is interested in nuclear weapons or war and peace. Many people express mild interest but few ever get involved. They feel it's too big an issue-what difference can I make? But if the first step to solving this problem is to produce greater peace in our marriages and other relationships, who but you can take that step? That's how it worked for us. We worked on both problems at the same time. We've reached a point where we haven't had a single argument in 10 or 15 years. I didn't think that was possible. I have to give Dorothie credit for that vision. It was a 20-year process to go from arguing all the time-that's how it felt to me-to never arguing. We had to learn a lot of things. But working on both global threats and our marriage at the same time actually sped up both processes. You can get more information about the book at anewmap.com. I want to ask you about technologists,' engineers,' and software developers' ethical background, or an understanding of the philosophy of the things they're building. Is this something we're not doing a very good job teaching?
It's a very hard thing to teach. When I was trying to decide to go public with the DES key size controversy, two NSA employees flew out and told me, "You're wrong, but please shut up. If you keep talking this way, you're going to cause grave harm to national security. " This was just before we went public, and I sat down that night to figure out what to do. The idea popped into my head:
"Forget about what's right and wrong and run with it. You've got a tiger by the tail. " At the time, I thought I dealt with that "devil on my shoulder," so to speak, and concluded that the right thing to do was to go public. But five years later I watched a documentary, The Day after Trinity, about the Manhattan Project. The people who worked on that project were asked, "What was your motivation?" They all said, "Nazi Germany. If Hitler got the bomb first, it would have been the end of civilization as we know it. " Then they're asked, "So when Germany was defeated and Japan was our only adversary, why did you keep working?" They didn't know why, and I think they fooled themselves.
In the same way, I realized I had fooled myself. I thought I dealt with the devil on my shoulder, but I had done what I think they did and what most people do. They figured out what they wanted to do, which was to work on this project, and they had socially acceptable reasons that they could admit-like getting the bomb before Hitler-and socially un acceptable reasons that they hid, even from their own conscious minds. Maybe something like, "Is my brain powerful enough to destroy a city? Could I be the war hero and have the girls fall at my feet instead of that stupid quarterback?" Watching that film, I vowed that I would never fool myself again. I didn't cause the same kind of damage as they did, but I could have.
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